Tuesday, April 12, 2011

Manu on Rajdharma in ManuSmriti


Manu’s era can not be ascertained exactly. There are no same opinions of scholars in this regard. He must have lived
at the dawn of the Christian Era or even before this in ancient period. The Smiritis or Dharmasastras occupy the
central importance in Hindu Political Thought especially about the regulation of life in its entire sphere – social,
political, economic, domestic, religious, legal and cultural. As mentioned before we can not trace a precise
development of Eastern Political Thought. It is also difficult to say anything definite about the period of Manu and his
famous work on Dharmasastra, the Manusmriti.


Manusmriti:
The political ideas of Manu are undoubtedly the most important and authoritative doctrine spelled out in his great
Smriti work. Brihaspati remarks Manu belongs to the first rank as his work embodies the essence of Vedas, and all
Smritis against Manu is unacceptable. Manu’s Dharmasastra is based on the disappeared Manava-Dharmasastra. A
traditional approach of Manusmriti is addressed to Kings and the rulers and no to scholars. There are many verses in
Smriti common to the Mahabharata. Suffice it to say it is a spiritual work par excellence and even superior beyond
comparison of great oeuvres.
Manu differs from many great sages of repute by treating the whole gamut of human life to be good consists of the
chemistry of Artha, Dharma and Kama. In the course of history he has become notorious for being the vocal
expounder of social stratification into castes and stages recognized in Dharma. It is a most pronounced and fashioned
dogmatically wherein declares the supremacy of Brahmans over the rest. He prescribes functional specialization of all
castes and exacts engagements in respective occupations. In particular Vaishyas and Shudras are compelled to
perform their religious assigned duties. Otherwise the entire world would be thrown into disorder and confusion. His
advice is partially followed in practice in the Indian sub continental region.
 Emphasized on the divine origin of Kings1
 Dandaniti (Coercive authority or Punishment) meted out strictly to the criminals. King should be prudent in
his judgment to punish those who break the Code and Law (Laws are made to be broken!). If a verdict of a
monarch is unjust it would be a great sin.
 Fear of punishment leads to the observance of the rule of law (Oriental Concept of Governance). It is in
danda that everything revolves around.
 The duty of a monarch is to enforce Dharma (Canonic Laws) and as such can maintain his/her prestige and
personality.
 A monarch should be very cautious while executing the Laws or Dharma and it must be correlated with
morals and ethics.
 A monarch must reign over governance based on the rule of law. He/she is the protector and guardian of
Law. Truth speaking, realist, reviewer of and well versed in duty and work.
 In delivering justice he/she is above the dharma, artha and kama. If a monarch is abusing and violating the
Law of commoner he/she is punishable.
 A monarch without assistant, and is a fool, selfish and uneducated in Sastras such type of ruler can not work
in a fair, impartial and just manner. On the contrary, a monarch who is transparent, duty bound, follows the
code of Sastras and intermingles with allies (friends) such ruler can suitably execute danda.
 A monarch should punish foes, and cultivate amity among friends without vested interests. Then the honour
for a monarch enhances.
 Brahma, the creator, a maker of the King/Ruler entrusted in him the responsibility to protect citizens and
the country.
 A monarch should offer service to the intellectuals conversant in all Vedas and follow their direction as well.
Humility can recover even the lost territories. He/she should receive knowledge of Vedas, eternity,
dandaniti, logic, self-education and practical aspects of life from the sages.
1 Following bullet points are heavily referred from Shirishchandra Regmi, Rajnitik Vichardhara (Political Thought), (Kathmandu: Vidhyarthi
Pustak Bhandar, 2056 B.S.), pp. 197-200.




 Monarch who conquers upon senses can only control the subjects. He/she should be completely divorce
from 10 types of Kama – hunting, jupra, day sleeping, criticizing others, pornography, womanizing, liquor
intaking, entertainment, vagabond - and 8 types of anger – backbiting, dastardly act, pointing demerits,
jealousy, finding faults in others, hiding wealth, acerbic utterance (sharp tongue), a strict dandaniti.
Intellectuals term these as the lust and a monarch should be free from such enticement. The enforcement of
anger-incited danda, cruel speech and the flight of wealth create greater miseries.
 A King/ruler should appoint 7 to 8 ministers from those whose ancestors have served since ages, who are
knowledgeable, bold, competent in the state of affairs and well versed in the warfare and meticulously
scrutinized or time tested. Appoint those from many according to the job needs and fulfillment. Without the
support of Ministers, a monarch can not rule the state and King/ruler must take action from different
Ministerial suggestions that do good for all. Warrior amatya exercises danda, humility expression in control
of action (kriya) danda and envoy exercises power of treaty making and in conflict. Envoys reconcile the two
opposites (factions) and divide the public of another enemy state. A King should bear in mind always the
dharma of Kshatriya to be prepared for a war. He/she never should turn his/her back from it.
 Rajdharma (7th Chapter of ManuSmiriti – the Consitutional Law or Laws for Kings) of the Monarch to
protect his/her subjects and to serve Brahmanas. A ruler should follow four edicts – (1) express no desire to
unattainable land, capital, etc; (2) to protect the wealth that was inherited or won; (3)always make an effort
to protect the dharma; (4) redistribute accumulated wealth. A monarch should achieve the unachieved with
the help of the armed force, care the inherited or won wealth, enhance protected wealth by expanding
business and redistribute accumulated wealth among the master minders of such activities. Through
coercion keep the citizens intact.
 Do not let an enemy of the state know your weaknesses but try every means to know their shortcomings. If
a monarch of the other state can not be controlled by even applying sama, dama (capital) and veda
(division) then inflict harm to the enemy state and hold sway over it. The ruler should extirpate his/her
foes.
 A monarch who imposes injury in subject’s lives, he/she will lose life as well as the Kingdom. It is opposite if
the ruler does good to the citizens and arrange necessary things for governance. That state or Kingdom
prospers and becomes happy. Life, wealth and the Kingdom of the Ruler enhance if he/she acts according to
the Code and Law of the Land.
 If the ruler believes his/her nature is fully satisfied and is omnipotent then only set division in an enemy
state. The ruler should be soft and rigid as the occasion demands. His/her nature and army should be bold
and strong and find weaknesses in an enemy state can he only attack. If the ruler can not bear the brunt of
enemy force he/she should take refuge in another religious and strong ruler. If this situation does not occur
then the ruler should squarely face the enemy.
 In times of crises, the king should protect the wealth and forgo it when there is a need to protect the spouse.
In extreme cases of self-protection he/she should give up both. If all calamities befall on the ruler he should
not relinquish dharma. Destroyed dharma ruins everything and defending the same protects. An attempt to
destroy dharma wrecks everything. Therefore, do not let the dharma peril. The Ruler should protect the
wealth of childless, orphaned, devoted, widowed and sick women. And this is Rajdharma.
The King and His Duties2
Manu’s view of the sources of state law resembles that of early Smiritis. The King to daily examine the suits of litigants
falling under the 18 titles of Law in accordance with the principles derived from regional usage (desadristha) and
from the Sacred Canon (sastradristha). The righteous King shall enquire into the usages (dharmas) of regions and
castes as well as those of guilds (sreni) and families (kula) and he shall then settle the distinctive usage (dharma) of
each group. In another Code the King shall establish law that may have been practiced by good men as well as the
virtuous twice-born classes provided that this is not opposed or in contravention to the usages of regions, families
and subcastes. These hints to the joint source of state Law as the Sacred Canon and custom. Custom in a wide sense
embraces the usages of local, social and economic groups. Manu admits one’s own conscience as the source of Law.
Manu asks the King to apply the lessons of Virtue and Wealth as well as their opposites in examining the daily suits of
litigants and to discover the internal position of men by external signs while discussing the modes of judicial decision.
The King in the latter application should discover the right path by inference as a hunter discovers the lair of a
wounded deer by drops of blood and the ruler should pay full attention to the witnesses to the time and place and to
2 Introduction and this section are heavily referred from R.C. Gupta, Great Political Thinkers: East & West, (Agra: Lakshmi Narain Agarwal,
such other factors. Abovementioned extracts implicitly recognize the early Smiriti principle upholds that justice
administered at the King’s court involves the application of human reason as the source of state Law.
Manu delves in length about the ideal of the majesty of the Kingship and the need of a firm policy – danda or
chastisement. But Manu holds that the King should “behave like a father towards all men (sic. citizens)” and please all.
Most probably reflecting actual practice Manu wants the King to regulate the economic life of the community. The
King should watch and control traders – ‘open cheats.’ The King must fix the prices of all marketable goods, mark the
weights and measures and re-examine them every six months. The professions and those engaged in various
occupations, manual workers, mechanics come under the purview of state supervision. Physicians or veterinary
surgeons who wrong their patients must be fined. Manu insists on appointing a learned Brahmana as the royal priest
and of seven or eight ministers. Every day they should be consulted on peace, war, finance, endowments and general
administration. The King should consult them first individually and then collectively and ultimately decide for
himself. Another official of first-rate importance was the Ambassador, a sort of foreign secretary and plenitpotentiary
who negotiated alliances and transacted that business by which kings are “disunited or not.” Manu also tells about a
number of other important officials who were concerned with mines, manufactures, storehouses, revenue, etc.
Manu develops the complementary principle of the King’s obligation along the three lines hinted or indicated in the
early Smiritis viz., the divine, the ethico-religious and the quasi-contractual, the first preoccupying the foremost
in Manu’s thought. Repeating in the first place the old Vedic dogma of creation of the four castes out of different limbs
of the Creator’s body, Manu declares the King is assigned to the Kshatriya the occupation of protecting the people and
so forth. The King receiving the Vedic sacrament is bound to protect the whole world and the Lord created the King
for the protection of the whole creation. The King as a Kshatriya has the most commendable occupation to protect the
people and it is his foremost divine duty (dharma). The King who enjoys the specified rewards is bound to discharge
his duty of protection, that the King who receives the agricultural tax, duties, fines, etc., but fails to protect his people,
goes after death surely to hell. Act according to the tax giver’s desire and punish wrong doers if otherwise he would
face foulness of the people and disturbed Kingdom and lose a heaven on the earth.
Even in the prosperous days of Hindu monarchy, neither in the Manava-Dharmasastra nor in the Arthasastra was the
King placed above the law. The King could make new laws according to the Arthasastra but to Manu he could not do
so. He could make laws passing regulatory laws and not laws substantive or laws making him arbitrary. It was
impossible to find Hindu judges and lawyers so much so that even the author of the Arthasastra entertaining the
Monarch to act arbitrarily. They tell the Prince that destruction and ouster befall on autocratic King. Manu did not
approve the idea of a King imposing his will upon his subjects unscrupulously and ruthlessly. On contrary Manu was
repulsive to the idea of autocratic or an irresponsible King. Manu’s King, in fact, was a constitutional and responsible
King who always respected the decision of his mantri-parishad and who himself was liable to be fined and
admonished for his mistakes and wrong-doings.
It will not be unwise to state that Manu, following the Arthasastra tradition, repeats, of course, with slight verbal
changes, the seven constituent elements (Prakriti) of the political organization (rajya) are : swami (the sovereign
ruler), amatya (the official), janapada (the rural area), durga (the fortified or urban area), kosha (revenue), bala (the
standing army) and mitra (the permanent foreign ally). Manu only puts in place of durga and janapada of the
Arthsastra list pura (the capital city) and rashtra (the Kingdom) and accepts the remaining five elements in original.
Manu shows the impossibility of one-man rule in view of difficulty and complexity of governmental affairs. He assigns
the appointment of high officials or ministers to administer/oversee after each department of the government
separately. Manu is unique in stating no particular staff is superior and among the seven ‘limbs’ of the state all are
equal, specialized and functions differently despite differing inequality in certain respects. The army which is the
means of controlling (the subjects) depends upon the Minister, the revenue and the kingdom depend upon the King,
while peace and war depend upon the ambassador in sharp contrast with Kautilya’s principle of distribution of
departmental assignment of the central government wherein with Chanakya’s appreciation of the political danger
from ministers, namely, that the revenue and the army should be reserved by the King for his direct control. Manu’s
principles and policies of government may be conveniently considered under two heads viz., public security and
interstate relations (matters relating to foreign policy – six types of guna).
Manu makes use of the old Arthasastra doctrine of the four political expedients of conciliation, bribery, discussion
and force. Manu opines that while all four expedients being properly directed lead to success, force should be
resorted to as the last alternative. Manu is reluctant on the point of using force; he also speaks with a divided mind on
the question of territorial annexation. As a general principle speaking in the same tone of Arthasastra thinkers
particularly like Kautilya urges the King to strive after the acquisition of countries that have not been conquered and
to protect those that have been acquired. But at other places departs from the Arthasastra thinking Manu deprecates
territorial annexation. Manu concludes by asking the King to abandon without hesitation even a rich and fertile land
(after conquest) should this step be necessary for his own safety. Thus the goal of interstate relations in Manu’s
thought is somewhat different from that of Kautilya and other Arthasastra thinkers. Manu’s conclusion is that the
political wisdom consists in arranging everything or every matter in such a fashion that neither the ally nor the
neutral nor the enemy can injure him and the state. It implies that the goal foreign policy consists in assuring for the
state its complete security abroad. A somewhat static goal compared to the dynamic programme of Kautilya’s foreign
policy involving the constant advancement of the state. Hence it is not inadequate to remark that Manu’s doctrine
deviates “from the ambitious standard of many Arthasastra thinkers and of Kautilya betrays the overwhelming
influence of the traditional conception of a staple social order.”3
 Examine Manu’s Rajdharma in the Nepalese Context. (Class discussion)
 Compare Manu’s Rajdharma with Kautilya’s Statecraft. (Class Discussion)
Kautilya: Saptang Theory and Statecraft4
Kautilya also known as Chanakya and Vishnugupta is known as the author of the Arthasastra (which can be translated
as The Art of Well-Being or The Science of Polity). It is a book which is part political philosophy, part manual of
statecraft believed to be written in circa 321-300 B.C. Although it has been referred to in other ancient books, a full
text was only rediscovered in 1904, when an ancient copy, written on palm leaves, was handed over to an Indian
librarian by an anonymous donor.
Kautilya was believed to be born in Taksila. He was educated in the university of international repute back then in
Nalanda wherein he met Chandragupta who had come there to receive himself an education. He was impressed by
Chandragupta finding in him the qualities of a real king of India. Kautilya’s dream of installing Chandragupta on the
throne of Magadh was realized when the latter became not only the king of Magadh but the imperial king of India.
Kautilya was a political advisor in the service of Chandragupta, the founder of Mauriyan Empire which spanned
across the swathes of northern part of Indian sub-continent. His unprecedented knowledge and wisdom led policy, a
versatile and well versed genius Vishnugupta uprooted Great Nanda Dynasty in Magadh Pradesh and replaced it with
Maurya Chandragupta reign. In this fundamental change in regime won by Shudra ruler, symbolizing Kautilya’s
competency in incessant political intellectualism resulted in offering to the world a memorable corpus developed the
Arthasastra.
Kautilya was not the first person to write Arthasastra, a book on the subject of acquisition and preservation of
dominion (pirthvi) – there were already three Arthasastra schools viz., those of Manu, Brihaspati and Usanas but
Kautilya’s Arthasastra is the only complete work of its kind that has come down to us. Arthasastra in modern term is
referred to the discipline of Economics. In ancient period the realm of Arthasastra encompassed widely. Kautilya
defines Arthasastra as “Artha is referred to a mutual behaviour of human beings and the designation of land vested on
human being. The study (sastra) of thinking about an option to acquire and protect this land is Arthasastra.” In reality
this is a great text written in Rajdharma.
The contents of Arthsastra comprise the branches of central and local administration, home and foreign policy, civil
and criminal law and the art of warfare. As Kautilya’s work is avowedly a summary of the early Arthasastra literature,
there arises the natural presumption that the same topics were handled by the above authors and his predecessors. It
is corroborated by Kautilya’s citations of their views under the above contents. It is not merely in the range but also
in the quality of its application to the problems state and government that it opens a new chapter in the history of
Oriental ancient political literature. For the authors, while making a detailed examination of the rules and principles
of state administration and policy such as is unknown to their predecessors and contemporaries approach their
problems exclusively from an objective standpoint.
In framing their rules and principles of government the Arthsastra thinkers in general apply the methods of
observation, analysis and deduction in respect of the phenomena of political life. The method of the science, in other
words, is primarily an empirical (if not scientific) one. In Kautliya’s work this is supplemented by some interesting
applications of what may be called the historical method, as the author occasionally draws upon traditional history to
justify his arguments. This is, however, made in the words applied by a modern historian of political theory to the
thought of Machiavelli to point a moral which has already been set forth and “adorn a tale which has already been
told.”(W.A. Dunning’s quote)
It is in the branch of state law that Kautilya’s ideas mark a great advance upon those of his predecessors. In section on
law and legal procedure, he refers prominently to four sources of the state law – the Sacred Canon (dharma), the
current (Arthasastra?), law (vyavahara), usage (sainstha) and reasoning (nyaya). If these laws are in conflict, he
explains the rule of interpretation wherein the King should decide a law-suit in accordance with the canon when the
3 U.N. Goshal, A History of Indian Political Ideas, Chap. IX, p. 184.
4 Following introductory section is heavily borrowed from Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan (eds.), The Concise Dictionary of Politics, (New
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003). Kautilya’s biography in Nepali can be found in Madan Prasad Aryal (ed.), Chanayakya: Jivani ra
Nitishastra (Kathmandu: Mrs. Ramadevi Aryal, 2064 B.S.)
current law is in conflict with the canonical works or with usage. Again in the event of conflict between the canon and
reasoning founded upon the law, reasoning will be the authority, the strict letter of the canonical text in this case
being regarded as dead. Comparing the above account with that of the Dharmasutras, we can perhaps trace a two fold
development in Kautilya’s thought. This includes apart form the Arthasastra (the current law) to the sources of the
state law and in the clear recognition of reasoning as one of these sources. In the second place he lays down a double
rule of interpretation in the event of conflict of laws. He seems to mean, firstly, that the canon prevails when this is in
conflict with Arthasastra, or else when usage is in conflict with the latter, and secondly, that reasoning based upon the
law prevails when this is in conflict with the canon.
As regard the authority of usage, his views agree with those of Dharmasutras. The king, he remarks, shall settle the
law on this subject n accordance with the traditional usages of regions, castes, industrial and other organization and
villages. The king, according to him, should abrogate such customs as is harmful to his own interest or are contrary to
righteousness, and establish instead the righteous customs. The king should adopt the righteous customs whether old
or new and not their reverse, and he should abrogate unrighteous customs that have been started by others. (Muluki
Ain, New Muluki Ain, etc) Kautilya, following the early Smiriti precedent, conceives the king to be subject to the law of
his order. He makes the king liable to clauses of the civil and the criminal law for the fulfillment of his political
obligations. This involves the application of the rule of law to the sphere of the king’s internal administration.
Kautilya’s approach to the nitty-gritty of governance and relations between the governed and those who govern was
not that of a theorist. As such, he was not merely concerned with systematizing theories of state. He made the politics
of his country an object of his immediate concern. Kautilya was a Srotriya or Vedic Brahamana. At the same time
Alexander’s incoming and the stupid administration of the upstart (Nava) Nanda concerned him more than his Vedic
studies. He thought it necessary to overhaul the existing system. He emphasized time and again that state was a life
on which depended social, individual and spiritual happiness. He reminded the people that the bases of civilization of
the Race are rooted in polity, that the sword which protects the people is the womb of civilization. Kautilya idealized
and idolized the country of Aryas as much politically as religiously.
The Arthasastra describes the means by which a state should be established and maintained in the face of the threat
of competing powers and an inherent danger of social instability. In the absence of the state, people are subject to the
‘law of the fishes’, whereby the stronger devours the weak. The role of the king is to enhance the prosperity of his
people, increasing the power of the state, and expanding the territory through conquest. The prosperity of the people
is enhanced through the promotion of trade, the development of infrastructure (such as dams and communication),
and the strict enforcement of a system of law and order. A comprehensive list of crime and punishment is set down,
ranging from being publicly smeared with dung for minor theft to being boiled alive for sleeping with a queen. The
power of the state stems from a strong basis in trade which is harnessed through a taxation system run by a wellmaintained
civil service.
The issue of territorial protection and conquest is the basis of Kautilya’s most incisive political thought, and can be
taken to be an early guide to the field of international relations.5 Here he deals with wide variety of strategies, which
can be used independently or in combination, to deal with different situations according to the relative strengths of
the opposition. These strategies include conciliation (through flattery, bribery, or other inducements), sowing dissent
amongst opposition, forming coalitions with other rulers, consolidation and the use of hostility and force. Different
circumstances are described, along with the appropriate choice of strategy, the likely outcome, and the apt pay-offs
for the actors involved. Kautilya has been compared to Machiavelli in the breadth of his statecraft, and also for his
willingness to use deceit and intrigue, not just against opponents but also to bolster the king’s reputation with his
people. However, the Arthasastra exhibits a repeated commitment to the welfare of the people, and principles of
order and justice. The duty of a conqueror, for instance, is to ‘substitute his virtues for the defeated enemy’s vices,
and where the enemy was good he shall be twice as good.’
Saptang Theory:6
In contrast to modern political thinkers who recognize territory, population, government and sovereignty as
elements of the modern state, for Kautilya seven elements (prakriti) are necessary for the state. He considers them as
also organs of the state and hence Kautilyan thought is as Saptang Theory. Manu states that these elements are
necessary for mutual assistance and cooperation. Each organ has different significance as they can not operate in
other ways or means. When they all work properly only the state can function.
1. Swami (King):
5 G. Modelski, “Foreign policy and international system in the ancient Hindu world”, American Political Science Review, 1964, 58(3), pp.
549–560.
6 To read more about qualities of Swami and Amatyas see Shirishchandra Regmi, Rajnitik Vichardhara (Political Thought), (Kathmandu:
Vidhyarthi Pustak Bhandar, 2056 B.S.), pp. 189-192.
Kautilya defined the position of the temporal king and his relationship with his subjects. Although Swami occupies
supreme position he reduced the ruler to that of the servant of state, or rather, as our forefathers put it mercilessly, of
a drudging ‘slave’ (dasa). The King should sacrifice his personal entitlements and wife if asked to do so by his
subjects. A popular and somewhat crude way of expressing the king’s position, but all the same enshrining the radical
demand of Hindu constitution from its king to sink his individuality into his office. With such principles the king was
virtually a constitutional slave. And the great monarchist Kautilya, (the Hindu Hobbes) would not allow the king to
have personal likes or dislikes. The king should follow the likes of his subjects. This lofty sense of forfeit made the
constitutional slave into the moral master. “One man who reigns numerous wise and brave men.” In Kautilya’s words,
“kings are visible dispensers of favours and disfavours, and as such they are in the position of the god Indra and Yama
respectively: he who despises them is visited with divine punishment.” He concludes, “thus the lowly folk should be
silenced.” In this significant reference a philosophical theory of kingship is a bit of commonplace platitude to lull the
discontent of the masses against their ruler. It indicates the divergent and contradiction stands in its composition of
extract of the text.
A state of nature resembles matsanaya and to end this evil state, the people, we are told by Kautilya, made an
agreement with a patriarch (Manu, son of the Sun). Manu is regarded in Brahmanical mythology or pseudo-history as
progenitor of the present lines of kings. Likewise, Kautilya remarks that the people’s agreement with Manu was
preceded by his Divine creation. Therefore in Kautilyan sense the people pay their customary dues to the ruler
evidently for inducing him to end the condition of anarchy. From Kautilya’s theory of the origin of kingship draws the
corollary – so relevant to this immediate limited objective – that the king’s taxes and punishments are necessary in
the people’s own interest as they provide him with the means of ensuring the security and prosperity of his subjects.
Kautilya further lays down the theory of the king’s equivalence to the two most famous guardian of duties of the
world by parity of functions and he derives the religious obligation of subjects to honour their ruler. Suffice it to say
success and failure of the state much depends on the quality of King.
2. Council of Ministers and Amatyas:
Irrespective of qualities and qualifications of the King, a Hindu monarch can never be regarded as a personal ruler. It
is a law and principle of Hindu constitution that the king can not act without the approval and cooperation of the
council of ministers. The law sutras, the law books and the political treatises are all unanimous on this point. As Manu
calls a King foolish who would attempt to carry on the administration by himself. He regards such a king as unfit. He
lays down that the king must have ‘colleagues’, i.e., ministers. That in their midst and along with them he has to
consider ordinary and extraordinary matters of state, even ordinary business ought not to be done by one man, not to
speak of the conduct of the kingdom. Yajnavalkya opines the same and so are other legal propounders. Kautilya
despite being the greatest advocate of monarchy has to say that matters of state should be discussed by the council of
ministers and whatever the majority decides the king should carry out.
It is remarkable that the king is not given even the power of vetoing. Kautilya in emphasizing the importance of the
parishad says that Indra was called ‘thousand-eyed,’ although he had only two eyes, because he had thousand wise
members in his mantra-parishad who were regarded as his eyes.
Similarly Kautilya considers the appointment of the amatyas (the officials) indispensable for carrying out the work of
government, and gives a comprehensive scheme of their functions. Government is possible with the help of assistants,
a single wheel does not move. The King should appoint ministers (sachivas) and abide by their advice. The King’s acts
have to be performed simultaneously, they are numerous and they are scattered in different places, and therefore the
King has to get his acts performed by the amatya lest there be a lapse regarding time and place. The amatya’s office is
justified by the impossibility of one-man rule and by the number as well as the wide distribution in space and time of
the governmental functions. All administrative acts relating to the janapada, he argues, depend upon the amatya.
Such are the acts of ensuring its security and welfare against its internal and external enemies, remedying its
calamities, colonization and improvement of its waste lands, and benefiting it through the collection of taxes and
fines. Amatya is the ballast to the security and development of the heart of the kingdom, namely its rural area.
Kautilya prescribes the fourfold test that of Virtue, Wealth, Desire and Fear laid down by his predecessors with
regard to the selection of the amatyas for special posts. The King must on no account make himself or his queen the
object in the matter of testing the amatyas, but he shall select the third person for this purpose. The King should not
corrupt an innocent mind which act would be like putting poison in water. If otherwise corrupted mind is beyond
cure and even a good person is corrupted by the four tests leads to jeopardy into evil. This credits author’s knowledge
of human psychology conveys a much needed warning to the King against the danger involved in the traditional
scheme. It is based on the author’s conviction of the tendency of temptation to corrupt innocent minds.
Kautilya leaves no stone unturned in touching other aspects of King’s administration such as military and civil
administration. They involve a number of important principles. Firstly, as said before, the King must hold the two
vital portfolios of the central government – the revenue and the army. Holding a strong conviction for this stand that
dissension and disaffection of the innermost circle of the King’s ministers might pose a danger. Secondly, the
departmental heads should not be selected for their merit but also be constantly supervised when in office. It is
founded on two allied arguments that human nature is fickle and that power breeds corruption (In the West, Lord
Acton’s maxim – power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely – The Eastern thinking is not backward
rather prescient compared to the Western Political Thought) warning departmental heads of mutual fusion and
conflict would lose and destruct the king’s substance. Thirdly and lastly, the army should be placed under a divided
command since this is a sure guarantee against treachery.
3. The Theory of Danda:
In Kautilya we notice a development of the theory of danda in three principle directions. In the first place he amplifies
the older view of the function of danda in the general make-up. Danda, he says (14 and 5), is the means of ensuring
security and prosperity of the three sciences, namely, the Sacred Canon (trayi), Philosophy (anviksiki), and Economics
(varta): in fact danda is their root; the course of worldly affairs (lokayatra) depends upon danda, and therefore he
who seeks this course should constantly be ready to apply danda. In other words the application of danda is justified
on the ground that it is the safeguard of man’s worldly existence while it ensures the fulfillment of his complex
interests as represented by the three other traditional sciences besides politics. In the second place, Kautilya applies
his deeper political insight to lay down a new technique relating to danda. The king who is severe in the application,
we are told, afflicts all creatures, and one who is mild in its application is overpowered by them, while one who justly
inflicts it is respected by them. This implies that respect for authority is ensured by the just application of danda in
contrast with its severe and mild application which leads respectively to the overthrow and disregard of the same.
Thirdly and lastly, Kautilya gives us a complete explanation of the function of danda by posing three alternatives.
When danda is applied with sound knowledge of the canon, it confers the threefold end of life upon the people; when
it is applied improperly under the influence of desire or anger or without knowledge, it afflicts event he forestdwelling
ascetics, not to speak of the house-holders; when it is not applied at all, it leads to the condition indicated by
the maxim of the larger fishes devouring the smaller ones. All this means that while the lawful application of danda
ensures the complete happiness of the individual, its unlawful or vicious application causes universal disaffection,
and its non-application produces anarchy symbolized by the law of the jungle.
4. The Theory of Government: Statecraft of the King
Kautilya’s views on the theory of government, under which he discusses three important subjects, the king, the
officials, and the mechanism of the administration, are equally important and show a considerable development on
the ideas of the early Arthasastra on several points. About the position of the king, Kautilya remarks that the king
makes or mars the constituent element s of the state according as he is properly qualified or not. Justifying in this
connection his own view against the contrary opinion of Bharadvaja, the author explains the supreme importance of
the king’s function. The king alone, he argues, selects the whole body of assistants; he directs the heads of the
administrative departments; he remedies the calamities of the human and the material elements of the state and
strengthens them; he replaces bad officers with good ones, he is constantly employed in honouring the deserving and
punishing the wicked; he endows his ministers and other subjects with his own prosperity, when he is prosperous,
the ministers and others being dependent upon him for their success and failure follow his behavior, for the king
stands at their apex. The king, in other words, is the master-key to the working of the whole administrative machine,
appointing, guarding, correcting, strengthening and shaping its different factors.
Kautliya’s arguments regarding kingship involve evidently a strong plea for the dynastic principle as well as the
principle of high birth. He holds that a new king is worse that a diseased king, because the new king acts without
restraint in the belief that he himself has acquired the kingdom. Again, he argues that a strong but low-born king is
worse than a weak but high-born one, and that the rule of conqueror is worse than the dual rule of father and son or
else of two brothers. It is the nature of prosperity to attend high birth, and hence the subjects willingly wait upon the
weak but high-born king, but the subjects tend to waver in their allegiance to a king who is strong but low-born. In
the same way, the dual rule is productive of equal security and welfare of the subjects, and therefore it ends to come
under the control of the officials. Thus, Kautilya reacts against the antimonarchic and the antidynastic tendencies
characteristic of the older masters.
Along with other things, Kautilya regarded education as the most important thing, which is to be given to the princes
with a view to training their minds and disciplining their wills. Hence he gives a comprehensive scheme of education
of princes. The prince we read (1-5), after the performance of his tonsure ceremony shall apply himself to the
learning of writing and arithmetic; after his investiture with the sacred thread he shall learn the Sacred Canon (trayi),
Philosophy (anviksiki) from cultured persons, Economics (varta) from the heads of the administrative departments,
and Politics (dandaniti) from those versed in theory and practice. The education is to be continued after the 16th year
when the prince has undergone the ceremonies of shaving the head and marriage; he shall devote the first part of the
day to learning the military science and the second part to hearing lessons on a large number of sciences grouped
together under the heading of traditional history. Through this intellectual training the prince shall learn discipline;
Kautilya warns that one who fails to keep his sense-organs or fails to practice non-attachment towards the
impressions of his sense-organs perishes instantly even if he were to be the ruler of the earth up to the founds of four
oceans.
Not only does Kautilya give us our first known complete scheme of the prince’s education, but he also presents us
with a list of the king’s qualifications. He classifies the king’s qualities under four heads: these are the qualities of an
inviting nature, those of the intellect, those of the will, and the king’s distinctive qualities. It is quite unnecessary for
us to go into the details of this pedantic classification. It will be sufficient to say here that it illustrates the author’s
sense of the comprehensive qualifications needed for the king’s office: these comprise the qualities of intellect and
character, of birth and training as well as of sound principles and policies of government.
5. Principles of State Policy:
Kautilya’s principles of government like those of his predecessors are mostly embedded in his discussions of the lines
of state policy. He writes about the king that when the king is alert, his servants likewise become alert. But when he is
careless, they become equally so, and they destroy his work and he is overpowered by his enemies. Kautilya further
writes that the king should perform his work with the application of constant exertion, for exertion leads to success,
while its opposite is certain to produce failure in respect of past and future acts. The author enjoins almost with a
religious solemnity the king’s observance of the qualities of exertion, dutifulness and impartiality. This culminates in
the author’s doctrine of the king’s complete identification of his interests with those of his subjects.
As regards the policy of state relief of the people against providential calamities, Kautilya remarks that the king shall
show favour like a father to his people when they are afflicted these visitations. The king is required to maintain the
infants, the aged, the diseased and the distressed persons, helpless as well as barren women and the sons of women
who are without guardians. On the other hand, we are told that the king should enforce (by fine or imprisonment in
some cases) the duties of slaves and pledges and relations towards their masters and principals, those of villageelders
in respect of the property f minors and temples, and those of relatives regarding maintenance of wives and
children, parents, minor brothers and unmarried as well as widowed sisters: should anyone embrace the monastic
order without providing for the livelihood of his wife and son or induce a woman to adopt the same, he would also be
liable to a fine; one who has passed the age of reproduction can enter the monastic life after obtaining the permission
of the judges. All this introduces us to a double aspect of the king’s paternal rule over his subjects, namely, the
humanitarian and the authoritarian.
Kautilya’s policy of acquisition of dominion has been discussed in Section 13 of his work bearing the title, ‘The Means
of Capturing a Fortress’. The author gives in detail the fivefold method of achieving this result, namely, by creating
disaffection among the enemy’s partisans, by getting rid of the enemy through secret tactics, by setting spies on the
enemy’s kingdom, by siege, and by assault. Here the author contemplates four grades of acquisition of dominion
descending from a king’s mastery over a state-system to his lordship over a few vassals. Nevertheless, the methods of
its acquisition follow a uniform pattern which is modeled on the means of capturing a fortress by the employment of
wholesale treachery and violence.
But more important than this is Kautilya’s policy of preservation of dominion. The rules relating to this policy may
conveniently be studied under four heads, namely, the policy of security of the king and the community, colonization
of the rural and urban areas, financial policy during an emergency and the policy of inter-state relations.
While discussing the policy of security, Kautilya first takes up the question of the king’s personal security by pointing
out its high political importance. The king, whose safety is ensured from those far and near, Kautilya writes (I, 17), is
capable of protecting the kingdom. The king, according to him, should secure his safety in his palace and particularly
in the acts of visiting his queen, taking his meals and attending to his other bodily needs, witnessing shows, visiting
gardens, hunting, granting interviews, and joining fairs and festivals. Secondly, Kautilya discusses the question of the
king’s keeping a watch over the behavior of his own officials as well as those of his enemies. This involves the
application of an elaborate system of espionage on the widest scale and with a high degree of technical perfection.
Kautilya enumerates nine different classes of spies called after their appropriate technical terms, and he explains how
the first five of these classes should be stationary and the remaining four should be peripatetic (roving): the spies are
to be set in motion to keep a watch over 18 classes of the king’s officials as well as over the foreign kings and their
corresponding set of officials. Thirdly, Kautilya discusses the measures which a king should necessarily take for
guarding his own loyal and disloyal subjects against the enemy’s wiles (trick) and for seducing those of enemy. Lastly,
Kautilya describes in detail the methods of detection and arrest of thieves and adulterous persons as well as those of
discovering stolen property and examining cases of suspected murder, and finally, those of punishing various types of
offenders including officials guilty of abuse of authority.
Under the head of colonization or rural and urban areas, Kautilya explains the scheme of state-planned colonization
of the rural area, which involves the application of the geopolitical ideas. Listing the programme of the all-round
development of the rural area in his work Arthasastra (II, 1), the author remarks that the king shall save his territory
from affliction by the enemy’s troops as well as from the visitations (trials and tribulations) of pestilence and famine,
that he shall prevent the people from indulging in expensive amusements, that he shall protect agriculture from the
burdens of fines, compulsory labour and taxes and the cattle-pens from thieves, wild animals and poisoners as well as
from diseases, that he shall protect trade-routes which are in danger of being made insecure in different ways, and
lastly, that he shall similarly protect all forests, irrigation works and mines and start new ones.
As regards the financial policy of the state in an emergency, Kautilya devotes one full chapter (V, 2) to the king’s
policy of replenishing treasury when he is without revenue and is faced with financial difficulties. The author
mentions alternative methods of compensating the royal exchequer by force and fraud through the agency of spies as
well as governmental officers. The fundamental principle underlying it is that the necessity of the king or the state
justifies the application of force and fraud in varying degrees for raising revenue in a grave emergency. This is subject
only to the limitation imposed by sound policy in the shape of avoidance of public discontent. When the author allows
the property of enemies of the state and of sinners to be seized on various pretexts in the interest of the state, he
anticipates a “twofold principle which was destined to be developed fully by Bhisma in the Mahabharata, namely, that
the interest of the state in its grave emergency overrides the rules of morality and that ownership is founded on
virtue.”7
6. Inter-state Relations (Foreign Policy)
Lastly, let us deal with Kautilya’s discussion of an old Arthasastra problem of inter-state relations arising from the
subjects’ attitude towards their ruler. Of the three vulnerable types of kings, namely, one who is plunged in a grave
calamity but is a just ruler, one who is plunged in a minor calamity but is an unjust ruler, and one who has disaffected
subjects, it is asked, which should be attacked in preference to the others? Answering this question in favour of the
last type, Kautilya argues that in the event of an attack the subjects help the first king and remain indifferent towards
the second, but they destroy the third king, be he never so strong. And Kautilya gives a solemn warning to the king
against ill treatment of his subjects in the interest of his own security. For the author, after giving a long list of the
king’s faults, because of which his subjects become poor, greedy and disaffected, observes that when the subjects
become poor they become greedy, that on becoming greedy, they become disaffected and that on being disaffected,
they go over to the enemy’s side, or else themselves slay their master: the king, therefore, must not produce the
causes tending to make the subjects poor, greedy, and disaffected, but on the contrary he should counteract them
immediately after their appearance. Poverty, greed and disaffection of the subjects arising by a causal chain from the
king’s faults, we are further told, lead to his destruction by themselves or by the enemy.
While discussing the policy of a weak king towards his powerful aggressor, Kautilya asks the weak king to take refuge
with a still more powerful ruler, or else seek shelter in an impregnable fort. The weak king, according to him, should
adjust his policy of purchasing safety according as the aggressor belongs to one or other of the three types of
conquerors, namely, the righteous, the greedy and the demoniac. When peace is established, the king should try by
guile to circumvent its clauses (clauses of peace-treaty); should the aggressor exact surrender of troops, he may be
given such elephants and horses as are disabled or as though able have been treated with poison, or else such troops
as will destroy or harm him; should he demand surrender of money, he may be given such costly articles as would
find no purchaser, or such common articles as would be useless for his fighting; should he demand land, he is to be
given such land as can be easily recovered or is open to the enemy’s attack, or is not protected by forts, or such as can
be colonized only with great expenditure of men and money.
In the light of above analysis we can now easily understand the goal of inter-state relations, as given by Kautilya.
Kautilya explains his plan for the alignment of its constituent elements by the analogy of a wheel: within the sphere of
the Prakritis, he says, the aggressor shall conceive the kings separated from him (i.e., allies) as the circumference and
those in between as the spokes and himself as the axle. Further, the author, while explaining the significance of the
place-factor in relation to the policy of attack, defines the aggressor’s sphere of influence: the whole territory, he
remarks, extending north to south from the Himalayas to the southern sea and stretching in the reverse direction for
a distance of 1,000 yojans is called the sphere of the world-ruler (chakravarti). The above ideas involve what may be
called a dynamic conception of the goal of inter-state relations. The objective f foreign policy, we are firmly told, is
progressive advance from a condition of Decline to that of Equilibrium and then to that of Progress.
Kautilya’s Contribution to Political Thought
Thus, Kautilya’s work contains the most perfect, the most complete and the most important contribution on the
subject of the state and its policies made by our ancient thinkers. Kautilya in contrast with some of his radical
predecessors based his fundamental ideas of society and the state upon the Smiriti pattern, thus helping to
rehabilitate the science of Arthasastra in the eyes of Brhamana canonists. It is tempting to suggest that he thus
“contributed not only to the remarkable conception of the superlative merit of Rajdharma in the Mahabharata, but
also to that wholesale incorporation of the Arthasastra material into the old Smiriti tradition constituting one the
most distinctive characteristics of the political thought of Manu and Yajnavalkya as well as Bhisma in the Great Epic.”
7 U.N. Goshal, A History of Indian Political Ideas, p. 138.

Tuesday, April 5, 2011



Aristotle

   Aristotle represents for most of us an icon of difficult or abstruse philosophical thinking; to know Aristotle often provokes hushed whispers even from highly educated people. For all this reputation, though, Aristotle is actually quite an easy read, for the man thought with an incredible clarity and wrote with a superhuman precision. It really is not possible to talk about Western culture (or modern, global culture) without coming to terms with this often difficult and often inspiring philosopher who didn't get along with his famous teacher, Plato, and, in fact, didn't get along with just about everybody (no-one likes a know-it-all). We can say without exaggeration that we live in an Aristotelean world; wherever you see modern, Western science dominating a culture in any meaningful way (which is just about everywhere), Aristotle is there in some form.
   Aristotle was born at Stagira, in Thrace, in 384 B.C. His father was a physician to the king of Macedon, so science was in his background. At the age of seventeen, he went to Athens and joined Plato's school, where he stayed until Plato's death in 347. A few years later, he became the tutor to the young prince of Macedon, Alexander the Great. Although Alexander was a stellar pupil, Aristotle returned to Athens three years later, founded his own school, the Lyceum, and taught and studied there for twelve years. Because Alexander began conquering all of the known world, Macedonians became somewhat unwelcome in Athens and Aristotle was accordingly shown the door in 323. He died a year later.
   Although he studied under Plato, Aristotle fundamentally disagreed with his teacher on just about everything. He could not bring himself to think of the world in abstract terms the way Plato did; above all else, Aristotle believed that the world could be understood at a fundamental level through the detailed observation and cataloging of phenomenon. That is, knowledge (which is what the word science means) is fundamentally empirical. As a result of this belief, Aristotle literally wrote about everything: poetics, rhetoric, ethics, politics, meteorology, embryology, physics, mathematics, metaphysics, anatomy, physiology, logic, dreams, and so forth. We aren't certain if he wrote these works directly or if they represent his or somebody else's notes on his classes; what we can say for certain is that the words, "I don't know," never came out of his mouth. In addition to studying everything, Aristotle was the first person to really think out the problem of evidence. When he approached a problem, he would examine a.) what people had previously written or said on the subject, b.) the general consensus of opinion on the subject, c.) and a systematic study of everything else that is part of or related to the subject. In his treatise on animals, he studied over five hundred species; in studying government, he collected and read 158 individual constitutions of Greek states as his fundamental data. This is called inductive reasoning:observing as many examples as possible and then working out the underlying principles. Inductive reasoning is the foundation of the Western scientific method.
   Outside of the empirical method, three characteristics stand out in Aristotle's thought: the schematization of knowledge, the four causes, and the ethical doctrine of the mean.
   The Classification of Knowledge. Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of Aristoteleanism is the classification of knowledge according the objects of that knowledge. The Greeks for some time had been concerned about the nature of human knowledge; this concern is called epistemology, or the "study of knowledge." For a long time, Greek philosophy dealt with questions of certainty; how could one be certain of knowledge? Suppose everything was an illusion? Aristotle resolved the question by categorizing knowledge based on their objects and the relative certainty with which you could know those objects. For instance, certain objects (such as in mathematics or logic) permit you to have a knowledge that is true all the time (two plus two always equals four). These types of knowledge are characterized by certainty and precise explanations. Other objects (such as human behavior) don't permit certain knowledge (if you insult somebody you may not make them angry or you may make them angry). These types of knowledge are characterized by probability and imprecise explanations. Knowledge that would fall into this category would include ethics, psychology, or politics. Unlike Plato and Socrates, Aristotle did not demand certainty in everything. One cannot expect the same level of certainty in politics or ethics that one can demand in geometry or logic. In Ethics I.3, Aristotle defines the difference in the following way, "we must be satisfied to indicate the truth with a rough and general sketch: when the subject and the basis of a discussion consist of matters which hold good only as a general rule, but not always, the conclusions reached must be of the same order. . . . For a well-schooled man is one who searches for that degree of precision in each kind of study which the nature of the subject at hand admits: it is obviously just as foolish to accept arguments of probability from a mathematician as to demand strict demonstrations from an orator."

   The Four Causes. If you walk out of this class knowing anything really well, it should be this, for Aristotle's "four causes" stand at the heart of Western rationality and Western science. In order to know a thing, anything at all, Aristotle says that one must be able to answer four questions (Physics ).
   Plato looked at the world and saw nothing but change; he wondered how we can know anything at all when everything is in motion and change. Plato solved the problem by postulating an unchanging world of intelligible Forms or Ideas of which our world is but an imperfect copy. But Aristotle embraced the visible world of change and motion and sought all his life to describe the principles which bring about change and motion. 1 Therefore, the question that dominated his thought at all points was: what is the cause (in Greek, aitia , which also means "responsible factor" 2) of this particular change or motion that I'm observing? What causes this thing to come into existence? What causes it to pass out of existence? Aristotle was the first major thinker to base his thought and science entirely on the idea that everything that moves or changes is caused to move or change by some other thing.
   What causes motion and change in the universe? The four causes: a.) the material cause: the matter out of which a thing is made (clay is the material cause of a bowl); b.) the formal cause: the pattern, model, or structure upon which a thing is made (the formal cause of a bowl is "bowl-shaped"; the formal cause of a human is "human-shaped"); c.) the efficient cause: the means or agency by which a thing comes into existence (a potter is the efficient cause of a bowl); d.) the final (in Greek,telos ) cause: the goal or purpose of a thing, its function or potential (holding cereal and milk is the final cause of a bowl). The final cause is the most unscientific, but is far and away the most important "cause" of a thing as far as Aristotle was concerned. Aristotle's analysis of phenomenon and change, then, is fundamentallyteleological.
   Aristotle's thought is consistently teleological: everything is always changing and moving, and has some aim, goal, or purpose (telos ). To borrow from a Newtonian physics, we might say that everything has potential which may be actualized (an acorn is potentially an oak tree; the process of change and motion which the acorn undertakes is directed at realizing this potential).
   The Doctrine of the Mean. The Four Causes are universally applicable. However, ethics is a science that admits of a high degree of uncertainty because of the infinite variety of human actions and motivations. Now, normally ethics seems to require absolute and unchanging principles ("Thou shalt not kill") which individuals depart from at their peril. The idea that ethics are "man-made" is a problematic idea (see the discussion of the Sophists in the Pre-Socratics chapter); the idea that it is the individual situation which dictates whether an action is right or wrong is, at least to early human society, downright revolutionary. But this is what Aristotle concluded and it fits in perfectly with his general empirical temperament. He works out an entire system of ethics based on the "mean" to serve as a guideline to human behavior.    There is no proper definition of any moral virtue, but rather every moral virtue stands in relationship to two opposing vices. Take courage. Courage is the opposite of cowardice. But, it is also the opposite of foolhardiness. Somewhere between foolhardiness and cowardice, that's where courage lies. What constitutes this "mean" between the two terms varies from situation to situation: what is courageous in one situation may be cowardly in another; what is foolhardy in one situation may be courageous in another. Therefore, every action needs to be judged according to all the relevant circumstances and situation. Aristotle called judging actions in this manner, "equity," and equity is the foundation of modern law and justice, and is absolutely critical in understanding foundational Christianity and its later permutations, such as the Protestant Reformation. But that's a story for another day.




 






Plato

   The most famous of Socrates's pupils was an aristocratic young man named Plato. After the death of Socrates, Plato carried on much of his former teacher's work and eventually founded his own school, the Academy, in 385. The Academy would become in its time the most famous school in the classical world, and its most famous pupil was Aristotle.

   We know much about Plato's teachings, because he wrote dialogues between Socrates and others that would explore philosophical issues. These dialogues would be used in his school as starting points for discussion; these discussions and Plato's final word on the dialogues have all been lost to us. The Platonic dialogues consist of Socrates asking questions of another and proving, through these questions, that the other person has the wrong idea on the subject. Initially, Plato seems to have carried on the philosophy of Socrates, concentrating on the dialectical examination of basic ethical issues: what is friendship? what is virtue? can virtue be taught? In these early Platonic dialogues, Socrates questions another person and proves, through these questions, that the other person has the wrong idea on the subject. These dialogues never answer the questions they begin with.

   However, Plato later began to develop his own philosophy and the Socrates of the later dialogues does more teaching than he does questioning. The fundamental aspect of Plato's thought is the theory of "ideas" or "forms." Plato, like so many other Greek philosphers, was stymied by the question of change in the physical world. Heraclitus had said that there is nothing certain or stable except the fact that things change, and Parmenides and the Eleatic philosophers claimed that all change, motion, and time was an illusion. Where was the truth? How can these two opposite positions be reconciled? Plato ingeniously combined the two; a discussion of Plato's theory of forms is below.

   The most famous of Plato's dialogues is an immense dialogue called The Republic , and, next to his account of Socrates's trial, The Apology The Republic is one of the single most influential works in Western philosophy. Essentially, it deals with the central problem of how to live a good life; this inquiry is shaped into the parallel questions (a) what is justice in the State, or what would an ideal State be like, and (b) what is a just individual? Naturally these questions also encompass many others, such as how the citizens of a state should be educated, what kinds of arts should be encouraged, what form its government should take, who should do the governing and for what rewards, what is the nature of the soul, and finally what (if any) divine sanctions and afterlife should be thought to exist. The dialogue, then, covers just about every aspect of Plato's thought. There are several central aspects to the dialogue that sum up Platonic thought extremely well: a.) what the nature of justice is; b.) the nature of an ideal republic; and c.) the allegory of the cave and the divided line, both of which explain Plato's theory of forms.   The Nature of Justice. The question which opens this immense dialogue is: what is justice? Several inadequate definitions are put forward, but the most emphatically presented definition is given by a young Sophist, Thrasymachus. He defines justice as whatever the strongest decide it is, and that the strong decide that whatever is in their best interest is just (review again the Athenian position in Melian Debate). Socrates dismisses this argument by proving that the strong rarely figure out what is in their best interest, and this can't be just since justice is a good thing.
   The Analogy of the Ideal Republic. After Thrasymachus leaves in a royal huff, Socrates starts the question all over again. If one could decide what a just state is like, one could use that as an analogy for a just person. Plato then embarks on a long exposition about how a state might embody the four great virtues: courage, wisdom, temperance, and justice. The remainder of the dialogue is a long exposition of what justice in a state is; this section is considered one of the first major, systematic expositions of abstract political theory . This type of thinking, that is, speculating about an ideal state or republic, is called "utopian" thinking (utopia is a Greek word which means "no-place").
   Plato (speaking through Socrates) divides human beings up based on their innate intelligence, strength, and courage. Those who are not overly bright, or strong, or brave, are suited to various productive professions: farming, smithing, building, etc. Those who are somewhat bright, strong, and especially courageous are suited to defensive and policing professions. Those who are extraordinarily intelligent, virtuous, and brave, are suited to run the state itself; that is, Plato's ideal state is anaristocracy, a Greek word which means "rule by the best." The lower end of human society, which, as far as Plato is concerned, consists of an overwhelming majority of people in a state, he calls the "producers," since they are most suited for productive work. The middle section of society, a smaller but still large number of people, make up the army and the police and are called "Auxiliaries." The best and the brightest, a very small and rarefied group, are those who are in complete control of the state permanently; Plato calls these people "Guardians." In the ideal state, "courage" characterizes the Auxiliaries; "wisdom" displays itself in the lives and government of the Guardians. A state may be said to have "temperance" if the Auxiliaries obey the Guardians in all things and the Producers obey the Auxiliaries and Guardians in all things. A state may be said to be intemperate if any of the lower groups do not obey one of the higher groups. A state may be said to be just if the Auxiliaries do not simply obey the Guardians, but enjoy doing so, that is, they don't grumble about the authority being exercised over them; a just state would require that the Producers not only obey the Auxiliaries and Guardians, but that they do so willingly.
   When the analogy is extended to the individual human being, Plato identifies the intellect with the Guardians, the spirit or emotions with the Auxiliaries, and the bodily appetites with the Producers. Therefore, an individual is courageous if his or her spirit is courageous and an individual is wise if his or her intellect is wise. Temperance occurs when the emotions are ruled over by the intellect, and the bodily appetites are ruled over by the emotions and especially the intellect. An individual may be said to be just when the bodily appetites and emotions are not only ruled over by the intellect, but do so willingly and without coercion.

   Does this arrangement satisfy you? Is this a fair division of the human soul? Is this a fair division of society? Before you even read Plato's critique of democracy, what do you think he would say about it? Would a democratic state be courageous, wise, temperate, and just based on the system Plato sets up here? What would Plato think of American democracy, which is based on elected representatives? What is the "democratic individual" and how does this creature come about? What happens to individuals in a democracy?   The Allegory of the Cave and the Divided Line: Far and away the most influential passage in Western philosophy ever written is Plato's discussion of the prisoners of the cave and his abstract presentation of the divided line. For Plato, human beings live in a world of visible and intelligible things. The visible world is what surrounds us: what we see, what we hear, what we experience; this visible world is a world of change and uncertainty. The intelligible world is made up of the unchanging products of human reason: anything arising from reason alone, such as abstract definitions or mathematics, makes up this intelligible world, which is the world of reality. The intelligible world contains the eternal "Forms" (in Greek, idea ) of things; the visible world is the imperfect and changing manifestation in this world of these unchanging forms. For example, the "Form" or "Idea" of a horse is intelligible, abstract, and applies to all horses; this Form never changes, even though horses vary wildly among themselves—the Form of a horse would never change even if every horse in the world were to vanish. An individual horse is a physical, changing object that can easily cease to be a horse (if, for instance, it's dropped out of a fifty story building); the Form of a horse, or "horseness," never changes. As a physical object, a horse only makes sense in that it can be referred to the "Form" or "Idea" of horseness.
   Plato imagines these two worlds, the sensible world and the intelligible world, as existing on a line that can be divided in the middle: the lower part of the line consists of the visible world and the upper part of the line makes up the intelligible world. Each half of the line relates to a certain type of knowledge: of the visible world, we can only have opinion (in Greek: doxa); of the intelligible world we achieve "knowledge" (in Greek, epistemŽ). Each of these divisions can also be divided in two. The visible or changing world can be divided into a lower region, "illusion," which is made up of shadows, reflections, paintings, poetry, etc., and an upper region, "belief," which refers to any kind of knowledge of things that change, such as individual horses. "Belief" may be true some or most of the time but occasionally is wrong (since things in the visible world change); belief is practical and may serve as a relatively reliable guide to life but doesn't really involve thinking things out to the point of certainty. The upper region can be divided into, on the lower end, "reason," which is knowledge of things like mathematics but which require that some postulates be accepted without question, and "intelligence," which is the knowledge of the highest and most abstract categories of things, an understanding of the ultimate good.


SOCRATES

   History. The growing power of Athens had frightened other Greek states for years before the Peloponnesian War broke out in 431. During the war, Pericles died in the plague of Athens (429); fortunes of war varied until a truce was made in 421, but this was never very stable and in 415 Athens was persuaded by Alcibiades, a pupil of the Athenian teacher, Socrates, to send a huge force to Sicily in an attempt to take over some of the cities there. This expedition was destroyed in 413. Nevertheless Athens continued the war. In 411 an oligarchy ("rule by a few") was instituted in Athens in an attempt to secure financial support from Persia, but this did not work out and the democracy was soon restored. In 405 the last Athenian fleet was destroyed in the battle of Aegospotami by a Spartan commander, and the city was besieged and forced to surrender in 404. Sparta set up an oligarchy of Athenian nobles (among them Critias, a former associate of Socrates and a relative of Plato), which because of its brutality became known as the Thirty Tyrants. By 403 democracy was once again restored. Socrates was brought to trial and executed in 399.



   Socrates (469-399), despite his foundational place in the history of ideas, actually wrote nothing. Most of our knowledge of him comes from the works of Plato (427-347), and since Plato had other concerns in mind than simple historical accuracy it is usually impossible to determine how much of his thinking actually derives from Socrates.



   The most accurate of Plato's writings on Socrates is probably the The Apology. It is Plato's account of Socrates's defense at his trial in 399 BC (the word "apology" comes from the Greek word for "defense-speech" and does not mean what we would think of as an apology). It is clear, however, that Plato dressed up Socrates's speech to turn it into a justification for Socrates's life and his death. In it, Plato outlines some of Socrates's most famous philosophical ideas: the necessity of doing what one thinks is right even in the face of universal opposition, and the need to pursue knowledge even when opposed.


   Socrates wrote nothing because he felt that knowledge was a living, interactive thing. Socrates' method of philosophical inquiry consisted in questioning people on the positions they asserted and working them through questions into a contradiction, thus proving to them that their original assertion was wrong. Socrates himself never takes a position; in The Apology he radically and skeptically claims to know nothing at all except that he knows nothing. Socrates and Plato refer to this method of questioning as elenchus , which means something like "cross-examination" The Socratic elenchus eventually gave rise to dialectic, the idea that truth needs to be pursued by modifying one's position through questioning and conflict with opposing ideas. It is this idea of the truth being pursued, rather than discovered, that characterizes Socratic thought and much of our world view today. The Western notion of dialectic is somewhat Socratic in nature in that it is conceived of as an ongoing process. Although Socrates in The Apology claims to have discovered no other truth than that he knows no truth, the Socrates of Plato's other earlier dialogues is of the opinion that truth is somehow attainable through this process of elenchus .

   The Athenians, with the exception of Plato, thought of Socrates as a Sophist, a designation he seems to have bitterly resented. He was, however, very similar in thought to the Sophists. Like the Sophists, he was unconcerned with physical or metaphysical questions; the issue of primary importance was ethics, living a good life. He appeared to be a sophist because he seems to tear down every ethical position he's confronted with; he never offers alternatives after he's torn down other people's ideas.


   He doesn't seem to be a radical skeptic, though. Scholars generally believe that the Socratic paradox is actually Socratic rather than an invention of Plato. The one positive statement that Socrates seems to have made is a definition of virtue (areté): "virtue is knowledge." If one knows the good, one will always do the good. It follows, then, that anyone who does anything wrong doesn't really know what the good is. This, for Socrates, justifies tearing down people's moral positions, for if they have the wrong ideas about virtue, morality, love, or any other ethical idea, they can't be trusted to do the right thing.

Forms of Government


WordDefinition
acracygovernment by none; anarchy
adhocracygovernment in an unstructured fashion; an unstructured organization
albocracygovernment by white people
anarchygovernment by none
androcracygovernment by men
anemocracygovernment by the wind or by whim
angelocracygovernment by angels
antarchyopposition to government; anarchy
argentocracygovernment by money
aristarchygovernment by the best
aristocracygovernment by the nobility
arithmocracygovernment by simple majority
autarchygovernment by an absolute ruler
autocracygovernment by one individual
barbarocracygovernment by barbarians
beerocracygovernment by brewers or brewing interests
bestiocracyrule by beasts
biarchygovernment by two people; diarchy
binarchygovernment by two people; diarchy
bureaucracygovernment by civil servants
cannonarchygovernment by superior firepower or by cannons
capelocracygovernment by shopkeepers
chiliarchygovernment by one thousand people
chirocracygovernment by physical force
chromatocracygovernment by rulers of a particular skin colour
chrysoaristocracygovernment by the wealthy; plutocracy
chrysocracygovernment by the wealthy; plutocracy
corpocracygovernment by corporate bureaucrats
cosmarchyrulership over the entire world, esp. by the devil
cottonocracygovernment by those involved in the cotton trade
cryptarchysecret rulership
decadarchygovernment by ten individuals; decarchy
decarchygovernment by ten individuals
demarchygovernment by the people; popular government
democracygovernment by the people
demonarchygovernment by a demon
demonocracygovernment by demons or evil forces
despotocracygovernment by despots or tyrants
diabolocracygovernment by the Devil
diarchygovernment by two people
dinarchygovernment by two people; diarchy
dodecarchygovernment by twelve people
doulocracygovernment by slaves
duarchygovernment by two people; diarchy
dulocracygovernment by slaves; doulocracy
dyarchygovernment by two people; diarchy
ecclesiarchygovernment by clerics or ecclesiastical authorities
endarchycentralised government
ergatocracygovernment by the workers or the working class
ethnarchygovernment over an ethnic group
ethnocracygovernment by an ethnic group or race
exarchygovernment by bishops
foolocracygovernment by fools
gerontocracygovernment by the aged
gunarchygovernment by women; gynarchy
gymnasiarchygovernment over a school or academy
gynaecocracygovernment by women; gynarchy
gynarchygovernment by women
gynocracygovernment by women; gynarchy
hagiarchygovernment by saints or holy persons
hagiocracygovernment by holy men
hamarchygovernment by a cooperative body of parts
hecatarchygovernment by one hundred people; hecatontarchy
hecatontarchygovernment by one hundred people
hendecarchygovernment by eleven people
heptarchygovernment by seven people
heroarchygovernment by heroes
hetaerocracygovernment by paramours
heterarchygovernment by a foreign ruler
hierarchygovernment by a ranked body; government by priests
hierocracygovernment by priests or religious ministers
hipparchyrule or control of horses
hoplarchygovernment by the military
hyperanarchycondition of extreme anarchy
hyperarchyexcessive government
iatrarchygovernment by physicians
idiocracypersonal rule; self-rule
infantocracygovernment by an infant
isocracyequal political power
jesuitocracygovernment by Jesuits
juntocracygovernment by a junta
kakistocracygovernment by the worst
kleptocracygovernment by thieves
kritarchygovernment by judges
landocracygovernment by the propertied class; timocracy
logocracygovernment of words
matriarchygovernment by women or mothers
meritocracygovernment by the meritorious
merocracygovernment by a part of the citizenry
mesocracygovernment by the middle classes
metrocracygovernment by mothers or women; matriarchy
millionocracygovernment by millionaires
millocracygovernment by mill owners
mobocracygovernment by mobs or crowds
monarchygovernment by one individual
moneyocracygovernment by the monied classes
monocracygovernment by one individual
myriarchygovernment by ten thousand individuals
narcokleptocracygovernment by those who profit from trade in illegal drugs
navarchyrulership over the seas
neocracygovernment by new or inexperienced rulers
nomocracygovernment based on legal system; rule of law
ochlocracygovernment by mobs
octarchygovernment by eight people
oligarchygovernment by the few
paedarchygovernment by children
paedocracygovernment by children; paedarchy
panarchyuniversal rule or dominion
pantarchygovernment by all the people; world government
pantisocracygovernment by all equally
paparchygovernment by the pope
papyrocracygovernment by newspapers or literature
parsonarchygovernment by parsons
partocracygovernment by a single unopposed political party
patriarchygovernment by men or fathers
pedantocracygovernment by pedants or strict rule-bound scholars
pentarchygovernment by five individuals
phallocracygovernment by men
philosophocracygovernment by philosophers
phylarchygovernment by a specific class or tribe
physiocracygovernment according to natural laws or principles
pigmentocracygovernment by those of one skin colour
plantocracygovernment by plantation owners
plousiocracygovernment by the wealthy; plutocracy
plutarchygovernment by the wealthy; plutocracy
plutocracygovernment by the wealthy
polarchygovernment by many people; polyarchy
policeocracygovernment by police
pollarchygovernment by the multitude or a mob; ochlocracy
polyarchygovernment by many people
polycracygovernment by many rulers; polyarchy
popocracygovernment by populists
pornocracygovernment by harlots
prophetocracygovernment by a prophet
psephocracygovernment resulting from election by ballot
ptochocracygovernment by beggars or paupers; wholesale pauperization
punditocracygovernment by political pundits
quangocracyrule of quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations
rotocracygovernment by those who control rotten boroughs
septarchygovernment by seven rulers; heptarchy
shopocracygovernment by shopkeepers
slavocracygovernment by slave-owners
snobocracygovernment by snobs
sociocracygovernment by society as a whole
squarsonocracygovernment by landholding clergymen
squatterarchygovernment by squatters; squattocracy
squattocracygovernment by squatters
squirearchygovernment by squires
squirocracygovernment by squires; squirearchy
statocracygovernment by the state alone, without ecclesiastical influence
stratarchyrulership over an army
stratocracymilitary rule or despotism
strumpetocracygovernment by strumpets
synarchyjoint sovereignty
technocracygovernment by technical experts
tetradarchygovernment by four people; tetrarchy
tetrarchygovernment by four people
thalassiarchysovereignty of the seas; thalassocracy
thalassocracysovereignty of the seas
thearchyrule by a god or gods; body of divine rulers
theatrocracygoverment by gathered assemblies of citizens
theocracygovernment by priests or by religious law
timarchygovernment by the propertied class; timocracy
timocracygovernment by the propertied class
triarchygovernment by three people
tritarchygovernment by three people; triarchy
tritheocracygovernment by three gods
whiggarchygovernment by Whigs
xenocracygovernment by a body of foreigners

Nations: Forms of Government


Definitions of the major governmental terms are as follows:
Anarchy - a condition of lawlessness or political disorder brought about by the absence of governmental authority.
Commonwealth - a nation, state, or other political entity founded on law and united by a compact of the people for the common good.
Communism - a system of government in which the state plans and controls the economy and a single - often authoritarian - party holds power; state controls are imposed with the elimination of private ownership of property or capital while claiming to make progress toward a higher social order in which all goods are equally shared by the people (i.e., a classless society).
Confederacy (Confederation) - a union by compact or treaty between states, provinces, or territories, that creates a central government with limited powers; the constituent entities retain supreme authority over all matters except those delegated to the central government.
Constitutional - a government by or operating under an authoritative document (constitution) that sets forth the system of fundamental laws and principles that determines the nature, functions, and limits of that government.
Constitutional Democracy - a form of government in which the sovereign power of the people is spelled out in a governing constitution.
Constitutional Monarchy - a system of government in which a monarch is guided by a constitution whereby his/her rights, duties, and responsibilities are spelled out in written law or by custom.
Democracy - a form of government in which the supreme power is retained by the people, but which is usually exercised indirectly through a system of representation and delegated authority periodically renewed.
Democratic Republic - a state in which the supreme power rests in the body of citizens entitled to vote for officers and representatives responsible to them.
Dictatorship - a form of government in which a ruler or small clique wield absolute power (not restricted by a constitution or laws). Also, a system in which the citizens do not possess the right to choose their own leaders.
Ecclesiastical - a government administrated by a church.
Federal (Federative) - a form of government in which sovereign power is formally divided - usually by means of a constitution - between a central authority and a number of constituent regions (states, colonies, or provinces) so that each region retains some management of its internal affairs; differs from a confederacy in that the central government exerts influence directly upon both individuals as well as upon the regional units.
Federal Republic - a state in which the powers of the central government are restricted and in which the component parts (states, colonies, or provinces) retain a degree of self-government; ultimate sovereign power rests with the voters who chose their governmental representatives.
Maoism - the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism developed in China by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung), which states that a continuous revolution is necessary if the leaders of a communist state are to keep in touch with the people.
Marxism - the political, economic, and social principles espoused by 19th century economist Karl Marx; he viewed the struggle of workers as a progression of historical forces that would proceed from a class struggle of the proletariat (workers) exploited by capitalists (business owners), to a socialist "dictatorship of the proletariat," to, finally, a classless society - communism.
Marxism-Leninism - an expanded form of communism developed by Lenin from doctrines of Karl Marx; Lenin saw imperialism as the final stage of capitalism and shifted the focus of workers' struggle from developed to underdeveloped countries.
Monarchy - a government in which the supreme power is lodged in the hands of a monarch who reigns over a state or territory, usually for life and by hereditary right; the monarch may be either a sole absolute ruler or a sovereign - such as a king, queen, or prince - with constitutionally limited authority.
Oligarchy - a government in which control is exercised by a small group of individuals whose authority generally is based on wealth or power.
Parliamentary Democracy - a political system in which the legislature (parliament) selects the government - a prime minister, premier, or chancellor along with the cabinet ministers - according to party strength as expressed in elections; by this system, the government acquires a dual responsibility: to the people as well as to the parliament.
Parliamentary Government (Cabinet-Parliamentary government) - a government in which members of an executive branch (the cabinet and its leader - a prime minister, premier, or chancellor) are nominated to their positions by a legislature or parliament, and are directly responsible to it; this type of government can be dissolved at will by the parliament (legislature) by means of a no confidence vote or the leader of the cabinet may dissolve the parliament if it can no longer function.
Parliamentary monarchy - a state headed by a monarch who is not actively involved in policy formation or implementation (i.e., the exercise of sovereign powers by a monarch in a ceremonial capacity); true governmental leadership is carried out by a cabinet and its head - a prime minister, premier, or chancellor - who are drawn from a legislature (parliament).
Republic - a representative democracy in which the people's elected deputies (representatives), not the people themselves, vote on legislation.
Socialism - a government in which the means of planning, producing, and distributing goods is controlled by a central government that theoretically seeks a more just and equitable distribution of property and labor; in actuality, most socialist governments have ended up being no more than dictatorships over workers by a ruling elite.
Sultanate - similar to a monarchy, but a government in which the supreme power is in the hands of a sultan (the head of a Muslim state); the sultan may be an absolute ruler or a sovereign with constitutionally limited authority.
Theocracy - a form of government in which a Deity is recognized as the supreme civil ruler, but the Deity's laws are interpreted by ecclesiastical authorities (bishops, mullahs, etc.); a government subject to religious authority.
Totalitarian - a government that seeks to subordinate the individual to the state by controlling not only all political and economic matters, but also the attitudes, values, and beliefs of its population.